to deal with scarcity in real estate is to build skyscrapers, a solution to the spectrum problem can be found by increasing technology so as to manipulate higher frequencies; to increase the ceiling on the maximum usable frequency. There are many ideas for changing technology to either move higher on the spectrum or increase existing spectrum efficiency. A compilation of these is provided in Electronics Division of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, Second International Conference on Radio Spectrum Conservation Techniques, 6-8 September, 1983 , UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM, U.K., 1-159 (1983) .
4. Jack Taylor, Technology vs. Allocation: Dividing Up the Radio Spectrum, TE-LEPHONY, Oct. 8, 1990, at 24.
5. Herter, supra note 1, at 653. 6. Id. 7. Taylor, supra note 4, at 24. The author compares what has happened to the radio spectrum with the settlement of the American West. When poor farming practices exhausted the soil, people merely moved farther toward California. Eventually, the open frontier ran out, which forced farmers to use more efficient methods of farming to conserve soil. According to Taylor, the same thing has occurred with spectrum. Overcrowding and interference from inefficient use of spectrum has led to the manipulation of spectrum at higher and higher frequencies, until the ceiling of maximum usable frequency (MUF) was reached, resulting in the need to reconsider spectrum allocation practices.
8. Herter, supra note 1, at 655. 9. Id. way as clean air and fresh water have been in the past. If radio spectrum is to continue to support such traditional technologies as radio and television broadcasting, air traffic control, and police and emergency communications, as well as accommodate newer communications like cellular telephones and satellite systems, it must be allocated equitably and efficiently, in a manner that takes advantage of the transmission characteristics of available frequencies.
Concern with the scarcity of radio spectrum is not new. In 1950, Harry Truman remarked:
The most pressing communications problem at this particular time, however, is the scarcity of radio frequencies in relation to the steadily growing demand. Increasing difficulty is being experienced in meeting the demand for frequencies domestically and even greater difficulty is encountered internationally in attempting to agree upon the allocation of available frequencies among the nations of the world.' 0 Truman realized 40 years ago that the scarcity of the radio spectrum had international as well as domestic implications for the growth of communications technology.
The problem of radio spectrum allocation has emerged again as an issue of international importance for several reasons. First, a variety of new communications products are being developed. The companies representing technologies such as high definition television (HDTV)," personal communications services (PCS),' 2 and digital audio broadcasting 3 do not want to expend resources on product development without some guarantee that they will be allocated the spectrum they need to support these new products. Providers of these technologies also assert that spectrum allocation methods in the United States are too slow, leaving them at a competitive disadvantage to Japan and Western Europe.1 4 Second, the Federal Communications Commission for radio spectrum allocation is crucial in determining the role of WARCs in allocating spectrum in the future. In addition to economic factors, geopolitical changes make a discussion of spectrum particularly appropriate. The last major World Administrative Radio Conference was held in 1979 (WARC-79). However,
[t]he world today is a far different place from 1979. Western Europe is more unified, eastern Europe less so. Some countries, especially along the Pacific rim, have made startling economic progress while other economies have faltered and some have even collapsed. Former enemies have become allies; former outcasts have been welcomed back to the world community. 2 Thus, there are international political shifts that will cause the United States to seek new alliances to achieve the spectrum allocation goals it desires. At the same time, developing countries or countries whose economies have been unprecedented growth may have greater demands for spectrum than they have had in the past. On the other hand, developing countries whose economies cannot yet support substantial communications technologies still want to preserve their allocation of radio spectrum for future communications needs.
Few outside the communications industry realize the magnitude of the problem of scarce spectrum and how it will impact the development and viability of communications technology in the future. New users and service providers are faced with nearly zero-sum growth because most of the technologically viable spectrum has already been allocated.
[T]he commercial telecommunications world is engaged in a titanic struggle. At stake is telecommunications supremacy, or maybe even survival. Telecommunications users and service providers are battling telecommunications innovators who see their chance to gain a share of the multi-billion-dollar industry. Given the absence of vacant spectrum to support new technologies, the spectrum iinovators can only prevail at the expense of the spectrum incumbents.1 3 In addition, a report by the Office of Technology Assessment to help United States delegates prepare for WARC-92 listed six major trends 22 This note will look at the allocation of spectrum from a historical perspective to see whether current mechanisms are appropriate for the future, given intense competition for spectrum and a changing geopolitical and economic landscape that will further increase the demand for spectrum. Auctions, user fees, and flexible use will then be examined to see whether they might apportion spectrum more fairly and efficiently than current allocation mechanisms.
II.

WHAT IS SPECTRUM: A TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
The birth of modern radio communication, and hence the discovery of radio spectrum, is usually credited to Guglielmo Marconi. 0 On December 12, 1901, Marconi was able to transmit the letter "S" in Morse code from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Cornwall, England, with a kite sent 400 feet in the air, a transmission of over 2,000 miles.
3 '
Not only did this newly discovered ability to communicate over long distances excite the public, but it also fanned the flames of entrepreneurship in communications technology. 2 A combination of this entrepreneurship and the powerful communications possibilities of the radio spectrum has provided modern society with television, shortwave and amateur radio, microwave ovens,, air traffic control, infant monitors, 
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and a host of other products and services which provide information, safety, entertainment, and communication. The entrepreneurial spirit is still evident today, with the introduction of such new products as cellular telephone and satellite communications, which depend on manipulation of the radio spectrum.
A basic understanding of how radio spectrum works is essential to seeing why it is both a crucial and a scarce natural resource. Radio waves are the foundation of wireless communications.
3 A radio wave can transmit information either as audio, video, or data signals by varying such characteristics as phase, amplitude, or frequency.
3 4 Radio waves are distinguished either by their frequency or by their wavelength. 35 Frequency is defined as the number of cycles a radio wave can complete in one second and is measured by an international unit of frequency known as a hertz (Hz). 3 6 Radio waves can also be designated by length of their wave, with the longer wavelengths having the lowest frequencies. 37 For example, the wavelengths for commercial AM radio broadcasting are very long, while those for microwaves are very short.
38
The radio spectrum is further classified into "bands" that group a series of radio frequencies together.
3 9 Bands are then described either by their wavelength or by name.
4 0 Hence, a band may be designated as high frequency (HF) or very high frequency (VHF), or it could be called the L-band, the S-band, or the K-band, a naming convention that was developed in World War II to keep actual frequencies secret. may also be designated to reflect the communications service which uses it, such as the AM or FM radio bands.
3
The ability of radio waves to transmit signals can be influenced by several factors." The weakening of a signal as it travels through the atmosphere is called attenuation . 4 Attenuation happens when radio signals pass through rain, clouds, snow, or sleet, with radio signals at high frequencies being more affected by atmospheric conditions than those at lower frequencies." This susceptibility to attenuation is one reason why communication over long distances is difficult at higher frequencies, especially those above 10 GHz. 47 Thus, the range of spectrum that can be economically manipulated by communications technology is currently limited by height restrictions.
Radio waves are both bent and reflected as they pass through the atmosphere. 48 Radio signals bend as they travel from one atmospheric layer to another, depending on the density of the atmosphere. 9 In addition, radio waves can also be reflected by the ionosphere, which is the top layer of the Earth's atmosphere. 0 The ionosphere is divided into D, E, F1, and F2, layers, with the D and E layers disappearing at night and the F layers combining into one, 51 leading to changes in the reflective properties that influence long-distance communication possibilities.
5 2 Reflection by the ionosphere makes it possible for radio signals to travel thousands of miles, enabling long-distance communications, particularly on the high frequencies (HF) between 3 and 30 MHz.
5 ' These same HF waves can catch shorter waves and channel them back to Earth using orbiting satellites. The amount of bending of a radio signal is related to its frequency, with less bending at higher frequencies.
5 At a certain frequency, atmospheric conditions prevent sufficient bending so that the radio signal cannot be reflected back to Earth.
5
" This point on the radio spectrum is known as the maximum usable frequency (MUF), 5 7 a point which can be as high as 30 to 40 MHz or as low as 6 MHz. MUF may also be influenced by the time of day, the season, and atmospheric conditions. 5 MUF can also be affected by the sunspot cycle, 59 although no one is certain why this is so.
The behavior of frequencies above MUF indicates why these frequencies are not as good for long distance communications as those from 3 to 30 MHz. Above MUF, especially for frequencies above 1 GHz, radio signals travel in nearly straight lines from a transmitter to a receiver. 60 The distance of line-of-sight communications is generally limited to the horizon, but since the Earth is curved, this distance can also be affected by antenna height.
6 Using line-of-sight communications requires that no obstacles be between the transmitter and the receiver, such as tall buildings or hills. 62 However, some lower obstacles do not pose a problem if antennas are placed on top of towers or mountains.
Line-of-sight radio signals are also substantially affected by atmospheric conditions, such as temperature and the amount of water vapor in the air, 64 making it possible for radio signals to travel farther than normal.
6
The unpredictability of the distance abilities of higher frequencies, especially those above 1 GHz, makes them difficult to rely on for 55 communications. 66 This lack of predictability means that international radio spectrum allocation is particularly challenging at these frequencies, since one of the basic functions of international spectrum management is to prevent or reduce interference.
6 7 Interference prevents the same frequency from being used again for many miles beyond the horizon because of the possibility that atmospheric conditions may carry a lineof-sight signal beyond its normal transmission limits, adversely affecting another country's communications.
6 8
Many users of the radio spectrum can operate in the same geographical region at the same time as long as they are on different frequencies; however, only one user can operate without interference on any one frequency in a given area. 69 These constraints mean that governments or other organizations need to allocate spectrum among a variety of user groups within a country or geographic region. Since radio spectrum cannot be confused within national boundaries and cannot be measured to a point past a country's borders, like the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea, 70 allocation of the radio spectrum must be determined at an international level before it can be further divided within a particular nation. Because the transmissions of one nation can interfere with or even jam transmissions of another, it became apparent several decades ago that international control of the radio spectrum was essential.
7
' Hence, a global organization was developed to set standards for international radio operation, 7 2 particularly in the area of spectrum allocation. This organization is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
III. ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOCATING SPECTRUM
There are international and domestic organizations and government agencies that allocate radio spectrum. Those The most far-reaching responsibility of ITU is the allocation of radio frequencies to prevent interference between its member nations.88 Member nations must then conform their own radio regulations to the international framework of radio agreements developed under the auspices of the ITU. 8 9 It is important to realize that the ITU has no power to prevent unauthorized use of a particular frequency.
9 " However, the ITU can deny legal protection under the Radio Regulations to any user who engages in prohibited "harmful interference" to another radio service. 91 Each member nation of ITU typically has its own organizations 
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and government agencies that are responsible for domestic radio regulation.
B. United States Spectrum Agencies
Two agencies are responsible for allocating radio spectrum within the United States per regulations provided by ITU. These two agencies are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The NTIA represents government and military radio users, while the FCC is responsible for other radio users, such as commercial, amateur, and local government.
9 2 The FCC is the most important organization for spectrum allocation in the Uniied States in that it has control over the bulk of current and potential radio spectrum users, including those in the communications industry whose new products will be vying for spectrum space in which to operate. Allocation of radio spectrum in the United States began with the enactment of the Radio Act of 1912.13 This legislation was in response to technical interference problems from government, commercial, and amateur spectrum users.
9 4 However, as commercial radio broadcasting expanded, the demand for radio frequencies soon exceeded the supply, and current legislation did not give the Secretary of Commerce the power to deny an application to use a particular frequency. The Radio Act of 1927 was an attempt by Congress to cope with widespread interferences caused by an increasing number of radio broadcasters. 96 This Act created a Federal Radio Commission (FRC) that was given responsibilities for assigning frequencies and reducing interference. 97 To expand this type of regulation to all forms of com- [Vol. 3:319 U.S."°° The Act also resulted in the establishment of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as an independent government agency that would oversee and regulate wire and radio communication. The FCC must exercise its authority within the scope and spirit of international telecommunications agreements, including the ITU.°2 Its primary functions are to allocate radio frequencies, determine which frequencies will be used by individual stations, and provide licensing to individual stations.
3 Operation of the FCC is conducted according to the Communications Act of 1934, the Administrative Procedures Act, and other laws of Congress. It is managed by five Commissioners who are appointed by the President, but who also must be approved by the Senate.1 0 4 Commissioners serve for a term of five years, and no more than three can be from the same political party. 05 The President designates one of the Commissioners as FCC Chairman. 106 The FCC staff is further organized into different administrative bureaus.
0 7 In addition to their domestic responsibilities, both the FCC and the NTIA have a role to play in representing the United States in international radio spectrum allocation. This role becomes particularly important for World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs).
C. World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs)
World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs) are responsible for making changes to international radio regulations. 08 Deriving their authority from the ITU, they are international meetings of government and private industry representatives.'°9 Radio regulations that are promulgated by a WARC are equivalent to treaties among ITU member nations, and must be adhered to when these nations formulate their own domestic communications regulations and policies." 0 In the United States, the Senate must ratify the Final Acts of a WARC before they are binding on this country."' At this conference, the radio spectrum was first divided into segments, resulting in a 
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States delegation, and the important outcomes that were achieved on an international, as well as a national, level.
A. Purpose of WARC-92
The official title for WARC-92 was the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Allocation of Frequencies in Certain Parts of the Spectrum.
1 2 9 Its primary purposes were to revise radio frequency allocations for new and existing services and to specify conditions governing the use of these frequencies. 13° Although not a "general" WARC per se, WARC-92 was important because it had the broadest responsibilities for allocating radio spectrum since WARC-79. According to Ambassador Baran, "WARC-92 will play an important role in determining the economic competitiveness of the U.S. in international communications technologies and the ability of the U.S. to achieve its own domestic telecommunications goals.""' WARC-92 was also held to deal with issues that had been raised at specialized conferences on mobile communications, space, and broadcasting.1 2 The need for the conference became evident with new advances in communications technology making increasing demands on spectrum that had already been allocated to other uses.1 3 Fifty-three delegates from the United States attended WARC-92, joining a total of 1400 delegates representing 127 ITU member nations and observers from 32 international and regional organizations.' 3 1 WARC-92 was preceded by 18 months of preparation on behalf of the United States delegation, setting United States requirements for spectrum, submitting positions to be used in negotiation with other ITU member nations, participation in bilateral and multilateral negotiation sessions, and coordinating spectrum requests between established United States government and industry groups.131
B. Preparations for WARC-92
Extensive preparations were made before WARC-92, from the distribution of a technical report that was agreed to in advance of the 53 Such comprehensive diplomacy may become increasingly necessary if the United States is to achieve its spectrum allocation goals, particularly as new alliances are formed and the economies of both developed and developing countries improve or decline.
In addition to United States preparatory efforts, planning for WARC-92 continued on several fronts. Organizations included in this planning were ITU's International Radio Consultative Committee and satellite-based broadcasting services; c) to obtain frequency allocations needed to support the National space program; d) to protect vital U.S. national security interests; e) to gain acceptance of new and revised radio service definitions into the Radio Regulations; and f) to ensure adoption of new procedures to coordinate the operation of nongoestationary satellite networks with other services operating in the same bands. technology, will need to be held more often. This idea has been proposed, 163 as have changes in the structure of ITU and its related organizations, 16 4 so that they can more quickly respond to ongoing spectrum allocation demands and communications regulation in general.
Committee 4, the frequency allocation committee for WARC-92, considered 22 different requests for spectrum. 165 However, the most important of these frequency requests concerned shortwave radio, 1 66 satellite sound broadcasting, 16 7 mobile satellite services,'68 high definition television,' 69 and space services. 70 Increased allocation for shortwave radio was considered essential, since such broadcasting is a vital part of promoting United States foreign policy goals.' Shortwave radio saw a surge in popularity during the Gulf War of 1991. An additional 790 kHz was allocated for shortwave radio during WARC-92, including 200 kHz on the most optimal segment of the shortwave spectrum. Satellite sound broadcasting, which would provide digital audio broad-163. Kleinschmidt and Rinaldo, supra note 86, at 17. 164. WARC-92, supra note 10, at 49-62. Some of the proposed changes have already been made to the structure of ITU.
The "new" ITU is organized into three sectors: Development, standardization and radiocommunication. Of the most interest to us is the Radiocommunication Sector, which includes the activities (other than standardssetting) of the CCIR. The work of the sector will be conducted through World and Regional Radiocommunication Conferences and Radiocommunications Assemblies, held every two years. Thus, "World Administrative Radio Conference" and "WARC" disappear from our lexicon. Michael Owen and David Sumner, The ITU Restructures, QST, March 1993, at 103.
165. Baran, supra note 126, i-ii, Table of Contents. The Committee's 22 requests for spectrum allocation were: high frequency broadcasting; low earth orbit mobilesatellite service below I Ghz; manned space communications near 400 MHz; aeronautical public correspondence; terrestrial mobile service; existing mobile-satellite service allocations; radio astronomy services; low earth orbit mobile-satellite services above 1 GHz; radiodetermination-satellite service; future public land mobile telecommunication systems; space services near 2 GHz; new mobile-satellite service allocations; broadcasting-satellite service (sound); wide RF-band high definition television; fixedsatellite service at 14.5 -14.8 GHz; general-satellite service; inter-satellite service for LEOs; radiolocation-satellite service; inter-satellite service for data relay satellites; uplink power control beacons; deep space research; and new space research service allocations near 37/40 GHz. One of the most significant allocation agreements was for mobile satellite services, including low earth orbit satellite systems, referred to as LEOS.
7 8 "Little" LEOS would provide data services at frequencies below 1 GHz, 7 9 and "Big" LEOS would support a wide range of communications services, including both data and voice.
80 Additional allocations were made for mobile satellite services (MSS) and geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite systems, so that spectrum will be available for these technologies in the future, since it is estimated that there will be tremendous demand for a wide variety of services that can be provided via mobile satellite systems. 
179.
Id. These data-only systems require very little spectrum and can be operated with inexpensive mobile equipment. They are especially practical where population density is too low to consider investing in a communications infrastructure built on wire or optical fiber cabling. Developing countries are especially intrigued by this technology as a way to economically reach unserved segments of their populations without extensive investment in infrastructure. It is estimated that there may be a $1-2 billion dollar market potential of LEOS, half from domestic sales and the other half being sold internationally. Id.
180. Id. "Big" LEOS will provide real time communications directly between two points any place in the world. They will also be able to interface with wireline systems or provide a direct connection between mobile terminals and satellites. Several U.S. companies are interested in these systems and counted on WARC-92 to ensure them the spectrum they will need before they are willing to make further investments in developing "big" LEOS. Estimates have suggested that by 21st century, there may be as many as 2 million subscribers to "big" LEOS. Id The question of political alliances was expected to be most evident in the deliberations of Committee 4. The traditional split between developed and developing countries was present, as delegates attempted to provide room on the spectrum for new technologies being contemplated by the developed countries without disenfranchising, the more modest communication goals of developing countries. benefit from new technologies so long as there was no change. Allocations for new technologies would have to come mostly from the fixed service. In the developed world, while there are fixed service operations at UHF, many of these operations have been or could be moved to frequencies above 3 GHz. Optical fiber is also increasing in use, which can free up some radio frequencies. In the developing world, the picture is entirely different. Frequencies all the way from HF through VHF and UHF are extensively used for fixed service operations, in many cases simply to provide basic telephone service to rural areas. Developing countries would like to take advantage of new technologies, which may involve satellites, but want to retain their terrestrial fixed services to provide basic domestic communications services.
193
More unusual was a rift between the United States and European countries, which had traditionally allied themselves to achieve common spectrum allocation purposes.
[A] split in the industrialized world was also evident. The United States came to WARC with numerous allocation proposals for mobile satellites, mainly targeted toward serving parts of the US and other countries with low population densities. Europe, on the other hand, was pushing terrestrial mobile service allocations, particularly the much heralded Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunications Systems (FPLMTS). These two giants were on a collision course. 194 These changes in alliances, particularly the new regionalism, had been predicted in WARC-92 preparation documents.' 95 Based on the frequency allocations made, WARC-92 provided a basis for emerging technologies that could become essential parts of communication systems in the 21st century.
1 96 WARC-92 was also significant in that it showed that a public/private partnership and extensive diplomacy between both developed and developing ITU member nations can have a positive and lasting impact on spectrum allocation in the future. 
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V.
OTHER ALLOCATION PROPOSALS A variety of authors have proposed alternative ways to allocate the radio spectrum. These proposals focus more on allocations at the national level. A discussion of each reveals strengths and weaknesses that may help determine whether they could successfully be implemented either domestically or internationally. It is first useful to review how spectrum is currently allocated, then to look at three of the most commonly proposed alternatives: auctions, user fees, and flexible use. Finally, the legal and economic implications of these three alternatives must be considered from both a national and an international view.
A. Current Allocation Mechanisms
Radio spectrum is currently allocated first at the international level. WARC-92 is a good illustration of how ITU member nations come to a WARC with extensive preparation and negotiation already completed. Within a WARC, delegates from member nations reach agreement on how the spectrum will be allocated on a worldwide basis. Typically, agreements can be reached that are satisfactory to the majority of member nations. Member nations that are unhappy with allocation decisions can request secondary allocations, 19 8 ask for footnotes to protect their desired frequencies, 1 9 or split the service into different frequencies among ITU regions.
2 00 WARC-92 was successful in that it made great strides in finding spectrum for new technologies without hampering existing spectrum users. The strength of a WARC-type system of spectrum allocation is evident in that international cooperation is fostered, which hopefully will result in compliance with allocation decisions. On the other hand, when WARCs are held sporadically, new technologies needing spectrum may have to wait several years before a commitment is made to allocate spectrum to them. With rapid developments in communications technology, pressure will build for spectrum allocation long before a WARC can be prepared and held. In addition, many of the WARC-92 decisions will not be implemented for 10-15 years. 20 1 While it is only fair to give 198. Rinaldo, supra note 127, at 52. Secondary allocations were made for verylong-baseline radiointerferotomy (VLBI).
199. Id. at 30. Footnotes were requested by the U.S. for "Little" LEOS to protect existing services.
200. Id. at 52. This was used to satisfy spectrum needs for HDTV among a number of ITU member nations who wanted to use different segments of the spectrum.
201. Baran, supra note 126, at 1.
[Vol. 3:319 existing spectrum users sufficient time to move onto alternate spectrum, waiting periods of a decade or more slow down the product development process in a global economy where companies must innovate to remain competitive. At the domestic level, the FCC is primarily responsible for spectrum once allocations have been made at a WARC. The FCC traditionally has followed a licensing scheme where companies and individuals make direct application.°2 Often cumbersome and time-consuming, "[tihe process by which the Federal Communications Commission allocates the nongovernment portion of the spectrum is in essence a complex series of coordinating activities. It includes negotiations with numerous other parties, both public and private.' '203 Over time, the FCC has adopted several principles to help it decide whether to grant a license, 20 4 which have been published in some form since 1935. 205 Looking at past decisions, the FCC seems to give the most weight to safety of life and property, the number of people served, and the amount of capital investment involved .
6
Currently, the FCC relies on a "block allocation" system, where the FCC estimates what a communications service will need and then
202.
For example, once an amateur radio operator ha passed the necessary examinations and Morse code requirements, a short application is filled out by a Volunteer Examination Coordinator (VEC). This application is forwarded directly to the FCC. Within 4-8 weeks, a license with callsign is sent directly to the applicant. The only charge is a $4.95 fee for Technician and higher license classes, which subsidizes the administration of the examination process.
203. John 0. Robinson, Spectrum Allocation and Economic Factors in FCC Spectrum Management, 19 IEEE TRANS. ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPAT. 182, 183 (1977) .
204. Id. at 185. These principles are: a) whether the service in question really requires the use of radio or whether wireline is a practical substitute; b) radio services which are necessary for safety of life and property deserve more consideration than those which are more in the nature of conveniences or luxuries; c) where other factors are equal, the Commission attempts to meet the request of those services which will render benefits to the largest segment of the population; d) whether the service meets a substantial public need and has a reasonable probability of being established on a viable basis; e) consideration of the most suitable place in the spectrum to satisfy the requirements of each particular service; 0 consideration of industry and public investment already committed to a particular frequency band. 
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allocates a range of spectrum.°7 Criticisms of the block allocation method are that the public interest standard is too subjective, the quantity of spectrum made available by the FCC has a direct correlation with the profitability of a particular communications service, and traditional spectrum users such as radio and television broadcasters view allocation as potentially harmful either in terms of interference or economic competition.
2 0 8 Other problems with the block allocation system are that it is not an efficient method of allocating spectrum, it is not flexible enough to adapt to changing technology, it is detrimental to research and development of products that would conserve spectrum, and that the inadequate resources of the FCC limit the quality of decisions that are made on complex spectrum issues. 2°9 In addition, the public interest standard is considered too vague to be so heavily weighed in spectrum decision-making and the block allocation system limits opportunities to do long-range planning on spectrum issues.21°S
hould the FCC decide not to grant a license, or when more than one entity is vying for the same portion of spectrum, a hearing must be conducted. 211 These hearings can be long, costly to applicants, the government, and the public, and are also subjective, since they rely primarily on information supplied by license applicants.
2 1 2 Given problems with the allocation procedures used by the FCC, along with difficulties and delays associated with WARC decisions at the international level, it seems prudent to consider proposals for other methods of spectrum allocation.
B. Auctions
New Zealand and the United Kingdom have already instituted auctions for spectrum allocation. 213 The proposal requires a first-stage application and a second-stage screening, but does not specify what the spectrum can be used for or how charges will be assessed. 21 7 There are a variety of arguments for and against the use of auctions for allocating spectrum. Auctions could be especially helpful in the assignment of frequencies within spectrum already allocated for a particular purpose.
21 8 A primary advantage of an auction would be that it could replace the time-consuming hearing process that is now held when more than one entity applies for the same segment of spectrum.
219
Since the amount of the bid would approximate the value of that segment of the spectrum, this bid could also be used as a shadow price for other parts of the spectrum which are not currently assigned a cost. 220 In addition, an auction could help determine the applicant who 214. Id. at 13-15. The U.K. auctioned the rights to offer programming on Independent Television Channel 3 in February 1991. The auction, which involved 40 production companies vying for 16 franchises, participated in a sealed bidding process, with the rights to the franchises awarded to the highest bidders. The entire bidding process took only six months, with an opportunity for public comment in the interim. The bidders were also evaluated on their capacity to fulfill the public interest standards that are the law in the U.K. as well as in the U.S. Countries such as Canada, Australia, and Italy, along with the countries of the European Community as a whole, are considering auctions as a way to grant spectrum licenses. Shadow prices would exhibit their greatest effect in the spectrum management function of allocation. Since they would provide a measure of spectrum value, shadow prices would also be extremely useful in establishing user charges. However, their primary importance lies in that [sic] fact that the knowledge of spectrum value provided by these shadow prices would enable the Commission to examine the economic cost of allocation decisions, would most likely use the spectrum to its optimum efficiency, comparing applicants by their willingness to commit financial resources. 22 1 It is also probable that an auction, as a single event with an established format, would be less expensive and less time-consuming than the openended hearing, which can last for many months.
22
Although there may be economic efficiency if an auction is properly designed and administered, 2 23 the disadvantages of this mechanism are the need for regulation of the public trust, 2 2 4 the danger that the ability of auctions to raise funds for the government will lead to sacrificing other objectives of spectrum management, 225 and the potential for market failure within the communications industry. 226 The so-called "deep pockets" argument has also been made, with the premise that a comparative hearing offsets the advantages the large firms with vast financial resources have over smaller firms that would be out-bid in an auction format. 227 In addition, there is a concern that the public interest standard that underlies assigning radio spectrum will be lost if a monetary measurement of spectrum value is adopted.
228
Other factors against the use of auctions for allocating spectrum are the administrative burdens, 229 the fact that an auction might not bring in the level of funding anticipated, 2 30 and that applying economic concepts to spectrum allocation would be a radical departure from the including the cost of holding spectrum in reserve for anticipated radio service development and growth.
Id. a]uctions may be superior to either comparative hearings or lotteries in the areas of administrative ease, transaction costs, and timeliness." Id. The same study also notes that "[clomparative hearings are time-consuming and costly. Lotteries are fast, but take longer than auctions and increase the cost to society of spectrum management because they encourage speculative entries." Id.
230. Id. at 23-38. Estimates the amount of revenue that could be generated from auctioning land-mobile communications licenses, looking at such factors as costs, revenues, and profits, consolidation in the industry, market projections, private investors, acquisition values, stock values, Office of Management and Budget forecasts, and foreign experiences.
[Vol. 3:319 tradition of viewing spectrum as a free, public good.
23 " ' On the other hand, an auction is said to cost only fifteen percent of either a lottery or a hearing, 23 2 with the processing time for an auction being three months, as opposed to twelve for a lottery and eighteen for a comparative hearing.
2 33 What is particularly troublesome about an auction is that it could become purely a revenue-raising scheme for the government.
3 4
A specific auction format has been proposed which would purportedly reduce the disadvantages of this method of spectrum allocation.
2 35 An auction is needed that would require a minimum amount of bidder preparation, would prevent collusion between bidders, and would have an outcome that would maximize the efficiency of spectrum use.
2 3 6 The type of auction proposed is a Vickrey auction, also known as second-sealed bid.
2 3 1 7 In a Vickrey auction, the bidder submits one bid, without knowing the content of other bids. 23 8 When the bids are opened, the winner pays the amount of the second highest bid.
2 3 9 This type of auction allows a bidder to value the item on his own, rather than trying to strategize according to what other bidders might offer. The Vickrey auction is thought to be a way to protect consumers, minimize price inflation, and ensure that prices will match the value of the item being auctioned. 
C.
User Fees
Charging for spectrum use is not a new concept. In 1969, the TAS method of selling spectrum to potential users was proposed. Under this proposal, spectrum would be sold according to measures of time, area, and spectrum, hence the designation of TAS, and would permit TAS spectrum owners to negotiate for alterations in the specifications of their allocations. would result in efficient use of the spectrum, as users traded with each other to maximize their spectrum needs. 244 Under TAS, once spectrum had been initially allocated, the FCC would have a very limited role, with market forces rather than formalized applications and hearings determining how spectrum would be used.
245
There are arguments for and against the implementation of user fees in apportioning radio spectrum.
2 4 If spectrum users were charged a fee related to measures of bandwidth, area of operations, or type of technology, there would then be financial incentives to use more efficient technology or reduce operating power in order to lower costs. 247 In addition, charging spectrum users seems to be a fairer system than letting the general population subsidize spectrum use via taxes and government-supported agencies. Such a fee would not only prevent excess demand, but could also generate resources that might help pay for spectrum maintenance and regulation.
2 4 9 In addition, it may be that imposing user charges would have the immediate result of reeducating the public, as well as spectrum users, that there is a cost for using this resource. 2 0 It could also encourage the use of nonspectrum based communications, particularly when wireline, cable, or other alternatives might be available.
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There may be difficulties associated with implementing user fees for the allocation of radio spectrum. First, courts have often concluded that a user fee charged for a particular government service cannot exceed the benefits received from the use of that service. It is not enough to figure the total cost (direct and indirect) to the Commission for operating a CATV unit of supervision and then to contrive a formula that reimburses the Commission for that amount. Certainly some of the costs inured to the benefit of the public, unless the entire regulatory scheme is a failure, which we refuse to assume. Without defining the limits of the COBRA delegation to the NRC, we conclude that the NRC has exercised its authority within congressional guidelines that provide sufficient standards. The NRC has reasonably lim-to allow the collection of fees regardless of the benefit obtained by the user. This is fortunate for those who would charge user fees for spectrum, since it would be hard to place a value on the benefit gained by access to the radio spectrum. Indeed, given the wide variety of concerns which use spectrum, from individual amateur radio operators to vast broadcasting conglomerates, different values would probably be needed.
Another. difficulty that would arise with the introduction of user fees for spectrum allocation would be the additional administrative burdens imposed on the FCC.
25 9 While a flat fee may be appropriate for some activities, it would not be such a simple arrangement when applied to spectrum allocation. 2 60 First, the characteristics of spectrum vary greatly depending on power, bandwidth, time of day, and frequency level. 2 6 1 In addition, the value of a segment of spectrum may depend on the particular user group involved and the services to be offered . 262 A variety of pricing mechanisms have been proposed, based on gross revenues, cost recovery, and opportunity costs. 263 However, the difficulty of some of these pricing mechanisms is that many services provided by spectrum are not sold, but are available to society as a public good. 2 64 In addition, many entities use spectrum for only part of their services, leading to the difficult task of determining what percentage of a company's profits were dependent on spectrum.
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Equally complex would be the FCC constructing a fee structure which provides an incentive to move to alternative or more efficient technology, as well as the need for the FCC to speculate as to which technologies would be most suitable for given segments of the spectrum, a particularly ited regulatory services to programs which it concluded, with sufficient explanation, were clearly applicable to all operating licensees. Further, it reasonably limited the charges to those licensees only. We are unpersuaded of error or impermissible arbitrariness in the NRC's implementation of the statutory directive. [Vol. 3:319 subjective task when considering future communications services . 266 Instead of user fees, granting property rights over a segment of radio spectrum is advocated as being easier to administer and more likely to result in the conservation of spectrum.
2 67 Spectrum saved via more efficient technology could then be offered to other users.
2 1 6 Such a plan has been proposed in Australia. 69 Under this scheme, spectrum access rights (SARs) could be sold, with the owner of a SAR being granted certain rights over a frequency allocation, the time it could be used, the geographic region that could be covered, and the maximum power level that would be allowed. 270 This is the most radical of the proposals for spectrum allocation and may not currently be permitted under the statutory language of the Communications Act of 1934.271
D. Flexible Use
A third method suggested for allocation of the radio spectrum is flexible use, also called flexible radio allocation. The idea for this method was proposed through the FCC's Office of Plans and Policy (OPP) in October 1983. 272 The study advanced defining segments of radio spectrum without specifying a particular technology that would be used. In response to this, the FCC set aside 2 MHz, a very small segment of spectrum, to be reserved for General Purpose Radio Service. Advantages of flexible use were identified as allowing more diversified ownership of the spectrum, providing greater ease of market entry, and permitting small scale innovation, 275 since companies wanting to introduce a new communications service could piggyback onto spectrum already held by a compatible technology without having to go through the lengthy process of license application and hearing. In addition, product innovation could go forward on a limited scale at first, with the opportunity for additional spectrum in the future. On the other hand, there are some dangers associated with flexible use of the spectrum. The first of these is that the flexible use licensee would in a sense "own" his portion of the spectrum, 27 6 which seems contrary to the Communications Act of 1934. The freedom for a spectrum user to determine what services would be offered through his spectrum is thought to usurp the statutory role of the FCC in overseeing spectrum for the public interest. 277 Even more unusual would be the ability to allow the granting of sublicenses outside of the primary purpose for which spectrum was allocated in the first place. 278 In addition, a spectrum "owner" would be allowed to stop a current service in favor of a new one without permission from the FCC.
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There are several obstacles that would have to be overcome before flexible use could be implemented: the current mandate by the Communications Act of 1934 for periodic license renewal, 2 0 the requirement that a hearing be held, 281 the protection of the public interest standard, 282 and administrative problems associated with trying to maintain control over licensees when the FCC would no longer be involved in determining the type of spectrum services to be provided. 283 Instead, the FCC's responsibility would merely be to issue "flexible" licenses, rather than those that specifically indicate what the spectrum can be used for.
28 4
Additional problems concern the extent to which flexible use would still preserve the status quo of current spectrum users 2 8 5 and the difficulty of recombining small segments of spectrum that have been licensed away in the past to form a large enough block to divide between flexible spectrum users.
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E. Legal and Economic Implications
There could be difficulties at both the international and national level in implementing any of these allocation methods. The Commu-276. Rau, supra note 93, at 178. Section 301 provides that the purpose of the Act is "to provide for the use of such channels [of radio transmission] but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, . . . and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 primarily out of concern that spectrum would be monopolized as it was back in the early days of spectrum-based communications. 90 However, granting spectrum via an auction or by the payment of user fees implies that it is "owned," even if only temporarily. 9 ' Instead, the Act contemplates a "trusteeship" model, where licensees serve the public interest in exchange for permission to use the radio spectrum.
92
The spectrum is considered to be publicly owned 29 A modification in legislation would also be needed to replace the hearing process required under Section 309(e) of the Communications Act. 296 Interpreting current statutory language suggests that there is currently no authority for the FCC to substitute an auction for the hearing process.
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The Communications Act of 1934 may or may not allow flexible use as a method of allocating spectrum.
2 9 Section 303(b) of the Act mandates that the FCC must "[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class." ' 299 If this section of the statute is construed broadly, it may permit spectrum to be classified for flexible use. 30 0 On the other hand, if the statute is read more narrowly, it would forbid the flexible use as an allocation mechanism."' The Act seems to charge the FCC with determining how a segment of the spectrum will be used by a particular communications service.
3 0 2 However, the premise of flexible use is that once a communications provider is granted a portion of the spectrum, the provider would determine how the spectrum would be used and would have the ability to "sell" or "rent" that spectrum to other users.1 0 3 The narrow view of 303(b) suggests that it is the FCC which must determine the nature of the service that can be offered in a segment of spectrum. delegate its responsibility for spectrum determination to a private party.°5 Flexible uses seems to fly in the face of the trusteeship model of spectrum allocation envisioned by the Communications Act of 1934. In order to allow the implementation of flexible use, the Act would have to remove such requirements as periodic renewal, promote minimal FCC supervision, ensure that the holding of a flexible license does not constitute "ownership," and recognize that local markets may influence what types of spectrum-based communications services will be offered. 0 6 Experiments are underway in the United States, as well as in other countries, to see whether auctions, user fees, or flexible use can be implemented as alternatives to existing spectrum allocation mechanisms. While there may need to be changes in the Communications Act of 1934, as well as a realignment of the view of spectrum as a public good in the United States in order to allow devices such as auctions and user fees to be implemented in the United States, the introduction of these methods on an international scale seems more problematic. It is one thing for the FCC to collect monies from auctions or user fees. It is quite another for collection to be done among the nations of the world. Supposedly, the responsibility for this would fall to the ITU, an organization which has not traditionally had a monetary purpose behind its formation. It is also not clear where the proceeds from auctions or user fees would go once they were paid to the ITU. Instituting these methods could result in adversarial relationships, with the larger, richer countries possibly being able to "buy" spectrum from poorer countries willing to subordinate their future communications goals for funds needed currently for other social problems.
Of the three proposed allocations methods, flexible use seems most compelling for experimentation on an international level. ITU member nations already accept primary and secondary use arrangements, the footnoting of spectrum plans to reserve spectrum, and a deviation from spectrum allocations within regions where no harmful interference will occur. Allowing spectrum to be defined for multiple uses could be tried on an international level without destroying the relationships between ITU member nations which were manifested at WARC-92. Flexible use could be blended into the allocation proposals submitted at several specialized radio conferences coming up in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Characteristics of the radio spectrum and the economic constraints of current technology mean that, at least for now, the sky is the limit 305. Id. 306. Id. at 188.
in terms of the radio spectrum that can be allocated for current and new communications technologies. Given these limitations, it is important that the available spectrum be apportioned not only among a variety of commercial and public concerns, but also between countries, whether they are ready to exploit it at present or not. The ITU has a rich history of being able to fairly allocate spectrum and the nations of the world have been willing to participate in this organization. The success of WARC-92 in allocating the spectrum to both the new technologies that wanted it and the ITU member nations that requested it proves that WARCs, or their successors, can continue to be the primary method of allocating spectrum at an international level. Some experimentation should be done with flexible use at the international level. This can be done with minimal disruption to existing allocation relationships.
At the national level, the FCC should continue to explore auctions, user fees, and flexible use for limited allocations of spectrum. Of these three mechanisms, flexible use seems to be the most workable, because it provides greater efficiency of spectrum without the administrative and spectrum-valuing complications of auctions and user fees. The proposed auctioning of a segment of previously government-owned spectrum is an appropriate way to test the effects of market mechanisms on a traditionally free public good. However, any type of market-based allocation method must consider the public, non-profit users of spectrum, who would potentially be deprived of spectrum if fees were charged for it. Society benefits from such free services that rely on spectrum as public broadcasting, amateur radio, and emergency communications systems. These services must be protected in the event that market-based approach is taken to allocating spectrum in the future. 
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